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The following three papers* are independent pieces, related to 
different segments of my current research. But they all share a 
common concern, both in terms of their topic and their 
perspective. They are written on the interstices of West and East 
European concerns. In a perhaps unusual way. Not in the sense of 
trading information about the East for theorical frameworks and 
tools of analysis provided by the West. Rather, they attempt to 
take the implications of the recent changes in the East of Europe to 
their theoretical limit; they try to use the mileage provided by 
these events and the insights that one can draw from living in 
between these 'two worlds' in order to re-think some of our basic 
assumptions concerning power - related to the modern state, 
society, individual conduct, and their multiple connections.
* These papers were all presented at the 1991 Congress of the 
Hungarian Sociological Association, Hungary in the World: Central 
European Societies from the Perspective o f Comparative Social 




























































































B. The modern state as a policy state
1. Introduction: The problem of the welfare state, again?
A study of the question of inequalities and institutional change in 
the second half of the 20th century immediately raises the 
question of the welfare state. And, indeed, once the current tide of 
liberal concerns, mixing real issues and rhetoric, is settled, it will 
only be a short time when the serious social problems will again 
be voiced. But the transition in East Europe happened, 
accidentally, in a period when for well over a decade, there was a 
prolonged discussion of the so-called crisis of the welfare state, 
identifying in this state and the related concept of 
'bureaucratisation' the common enemy in both East and West. In a 
new clothing, the old enemy of 'the state' was thought to be again 
on the rampage.
In spite of its popular appeal and easy mobilising power, there are 
serious faults with this approach. Both its diagnistic and analytical 
power is fairly impaired. First, it is highly questionable whether it 
is the 'bureaucracy' which is the 'main enemy' today, along the 
lines of a Habermasian vision. This is not so much the correct 
diagnosis of our current concerns, of the state of affairs, as the - 
hopefully last - application of an obsolete discourse to a situation 
where it lost all its relevance; a discourse which on the one hand 
looks for an enemy to identify and annihilate; an enemy that is 
always close at hand, that everyone can easily perceive; and to 
offer consolation with an ideal discourse where this 'enemy' will 
no longer have any place. In this attitude, the conception of 
criticism as the elimination of the opposite side became all-too- 
often close to actual, physical annihilation; and the utopias always 
turned out to be a nightmare. To state just a truism that will be a 
little elaborated later, the modem world is a much more complex 
piece of reality that this game with the bureaucracy and the state 




























































































Second, it is also questionable whether the 'state' can be used as a 
universal category identifying jointly the main problems of both 
East and West, as the neoliberal or other scenarios affirm. As we 
argued elsewhere, the state which became problematic in the 
West was a much more different piece of reality than the party- 
states or rather state-parties of the East. (1) Moreover, 
concerning the former East European systems, the emphasis on 
the state is itself misleading, as the actual organs of the state, both 
at the central and local level, were always subordinate to the 
respective party organs. And if one is analysing the concrete, daily 
activity of the party apparatus, one soon discovers that even if 
there were obvious aspects of rigid hiearchy and bureaucracy 
within the apparatus, to claim that it was a 'bureaucratic machine' 
is simply to misunderstand how the mechanism actually worked.
Finally, these considerations already point to a major analytical 
problem: the usefulness of the 'theory of the state'. Too much 
discussion in the past was put in these theoretical terms, closely 
reminescent of the standard preoccupation of classical German 
philosophy: What is the 'nature' of the state? What are its origins 
and purpose? There is a peculiar, mutual conditioning between 
the specific characteristics of the German state and German 
philosophy itself: on the one hand, the method of searching for the 
'essence' and the 'basic nature'; on the other, the state being an 
all-too natural topic for this kind of investigation - the ideal 
harmony between method and topic not being restricted to the 
case of Hegel, but characteristic to the whole approach up to the 
Frankfurt school in particular and critical theory in general.
This paper therefore will not attempt to discuss 'the' state or 'the' 
theory of the state. Nevertheless, it intend to be a conceptual 
exercise on problems related to the specificity of the modern 
state. But instead of assuming a priori the existence of a unified 
object, the state, it rather tries to establish what is specific, what 
is different about this modern state, compared to all other types 
of political systems and institutions, or organisations of the 'body 
politic'. And for this, it proposes to start with an analysis of what 



























































































At one level, the answer to the problem seems obvious. A state as 
a form of political organisation deals with political issues; 
whatever belongs to politics. We are thus lead to the enormous, 
and also general question of 'what is politics'? However, if we 
restrict our attention to the modem state, and to the question of 
what is specific about its activities, we find here an important 
difference. The basic target of most activities of modern states is 
not politics, but 'policy', or 'policy-making'.
2. The peculiar strangeness of 'policy'
This is a distinction that exists in English, but not in other 
languages; it is even very difficult to characterise it there. (2) 
Still, this paper insists that this point is crucial, and not just a 
verbal game. The point can be illustrated with the contemporary 
Hungarian political scene. What most actors have in mind about 
the 'nature' of politics is the traditional concerns of politics or 
'politicking': questions of personal leadership; party politics; 
ideological and personal confrontations, power struggles. The focus 
is on the legislative body; the main question is 'who': who is in 
position, who has the power to decide, who is to be prevented or 
excluded from making decisions. The current political scene is a 
peculiar mixture of activities that were prevented by the former 
communist systems - the open play of conflicts, the importance of 
the Parliament, the plurality of parties, etc. -, and ideas, pictures 
and 'mentalities' taken over from the former system. The whole 
idea of 'policy-making' is almost missing from the scene; its 
Hungarian translation - 'politika-csinalas' - certainly sounds more 
as an item from witchcraft and secret practices, not the 
preparation of public 'policies'.
Let's stop here for a moment, and try to specify the meaning and 
scope of this concept of 'policy'. No matter how obvious and 
unobstrusive its English meaning seems to be, there is more here 
than meets the eye. Such an undertaking is all the more justified, 




























































































the study of policy-making from the mainstream of political 
science; to mark its specificity by creating a new academic 
discipline, policy analysis or the 'policy sciences', especially in the 
United States, but also in England.
Before reviewing the positive definitions of 'policy', 'policy- 
making', or 'public policy', let's first study the way its distance 
was established with respect to politics; something that was 
considered to be crucial for the proponents of the new discipline. 
Two points will be considered here. The first is a question of 
evaluation, a distinction made between 'politics' and 'policy' in 
evaluative terms. The central characteristics of this distinction 
remained the same since the programmatic statement of Lasswell: 
while 'politics' deals with matters involving confrontation, 
partisanship, even corruption, 'policy' is clean, and deals only with 
matters of common interest or concern. (3) This common usage 
has an interesting contrast with the Aristotelian concept of 
politics. For Aristotle, it was exactly the business of politics to deal 
with the common matters of the city. In the modern state, it 
seems as if policy-making were taking over this task, once politics 
proper could not be trusted with the common good. But, as we'll 
see later in more detail, policy-making is much different from 
'politics' in other respects as well, for example concerning the 
importance of the possession of information and expertise. This is 
an issue which has utmost importance, among others, for the 
question of democracy.
The second is an analytical point, and refers to the place of this 
new 'science' between political science and administrative science; 
a relation that must reflect the way 'policy-making' originally 
marked out its space with respect to the traditional fields of 
politics and administration. Earlier, the distinction between politcs 
and administration was at least analytically clear. 'Politics' dealt 
with the making of decisions, at the high positions; 'administation' 
referred to the low-level execution of the decisions. Now, even in 
the past, in daily reality, the drawing of the lines was more 
difficult. But with the concept of policy-making, even in principle, 




























































































politics and administration, with 'policy-making' , the emphasis is 
not on the distance, but on the links and connections made 
between the two. Policy-making is at once a political and 
administrative activity; it links the two, continuously establishing 
connections.
3. Definitions of 'policy'
In a positive sense, most definitions on policy lay emphasis on 
three distinct elements: firstly, that an objective, a goal, is 
involved, that policy is always a matter of choice, and not just a 
chance event; secondly, that it is never a question of a single 
decision or choice made, but is related to a course of action or 
events, it is a regular, lasting pattern; and finally, that it is not 
merely a question of purpose or choice, but is related to the actual 
implementation of the aims in reality. (4)
In most definitions, especially the ones given in mainstream 
American policy science textbooks, 'policy' is basically identical 
with rational choice or decision. Thus, according to Anderson, it is 
'a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors 
in dealing with a problem or matter of concern'; (5) Meehan 
states that 'the most promising line of development treats a policy 
as a guide to action or choice'; (6) and according to Lasswell, it 
deals with 'the most important choices made either in organized 
or in private life.' (7) In this context, 'public policy' is the specific 
case when a policy decision was made by the government. (8)
The problem is that at this general level, 'policy' becomes 
undistinguishable from the rationality of behaviour 'as such'; 
especially interpreted in the sense of economic rationality. There 
is an everpresent possibility that 'policy sciences' become 
identified with a general theory of choice, in the same way as 
there is an identical tendency in economics. In the latter case, this 
was 'realised' by the idea of von Mises about economics as a 
general praxeology; (9) in case of the former, there is the 



























































































the government, in a general framework of 'rational choice', and 
then, in the general, to add policy-making into the general theory 
of economics.
However, it is also obvious from an overview of the different 
definitions given to policy that this activity involves a type of 
decision-making that is different from the activities of a 'homo 
oeconomicus'. Firstly, policy-making is always eventual, and in two 
senses. It is related to concrete problems, dislocations and 
blockages in the ordinary course of events, while economic theory 
(and the theory of rational choice) intends to dessribe and explain 
all aspects of behavior. Secondly, the outcomes in this case are 
never given from the start. In this sense, there is a large gap 
between policy and economics, corresponding roughly to the 
difference between the words 'decision' and 'choice'. In case of a 
choice, the alternatives are always given, the only question is the 
selection. Policy-making, however, involves more than that: the 
innovative formulation of alternatives, the creation of a piece of 
reality that was not given beforehand. Third, in case of policy 
decisions, as opposed to economic choice, the problem of 
'expertise' comes to the fore. According to economic theory, every 
man is an economic man, capable fo making rational decisions. The 
idea according to which politics reduced to policy-making should 
be reduced to a general theory of choice leads to two different 
implications. According to the first, 'libertarian' implications, 
policy-making involves the same choice as the selection of a 
consumer-basket in a supermarket; thus, there is no need for a 
separate actor like the government. This is a hyper-democratic 
implication - except, of course, for the fact of inequalities. The 
other implication is quite different, the exact opposite. According 
to this, policy-making involves special, complex decisions, that has 
to take into accont a large number of information. This is a matter 
for experts only. This is a distinctively undemocratic implication. 
Without further, abstract discussion, it should be pointed out that 
there is some peculiarity in the fact that while the major activity 
the liberal democratic world-view is giving to the citizen is choice 
- in terms of consumer choice and electoral voting - is only 




























































































although its Importance is unquestioned and its results 
everpresent, does not find an easy place in this universe.
But policy is concerned with something more than just choice: 
with guidance, the provision of direction. As the second element 
mentioned in most definitions states it, the target of policy is a 
lasting pattern, a course of actions, the shaping and altering of this 
course. And the way policy is related to the ordinary course of 
events is the solution of eventual problems or restitution. Time 
and again, one encounters very explicit medical analogies in books 
on policy making. While the first point made in this paragraph is 
close to the traditional view of politics, it is complemented with 
the second one, which is diametrically opposed to this.
This duality can explain, on the one hand, the coexistence of two, 
seemingly contradictory elements in the definitions: the emphasis 
on intentionality and change on the one hand, and the importance 
laid on the fact that policy always implies recurrent pettern, 
inertia, on the other. But what is common in most aspects is that 
the activity of policy-making always presupposes a separate, very 
diverse filed of reality existing independently of policy-makers or 
policy-making, and where the intervention will always be 
external and occasional.
Let's now analyse this point in detail, the third common point of 
the definitions mentioned above, the question of the specific 
relation policy-making has with reality. Before this analysis, two 
additional points. First, another difference between policy-making 
and politics is that, as opposed to the latter, the former is 
continuous task. It is related to concrete problems, to individual 
decisions, that emerge continuously in the daily activity of policy­
makers. Politics is usually a top-level activity, the occasional 
making of some large-scale decisions that will effect a lot of 
people for a long time; or, in another sense, it refers to constant 
'politicking', interest group and other struggles. Policy-making is 
distinctively different from both meanings of politics. It is 
problem-oriented, and not partisan (at least in principle): but it is 




























































































politics, the feedback comes after four years. In policy, it is almost 
coexistent with the decision. (10)
Second, another recurrent point in definitions of policy is the 
explicit emphasis on non-decisions and non-activity; no doubt due 
to the fact that the widely discussed work of Bachrach and Baratz 
introduced this idea into the debates. It is time and again 
emphasized that policy-makers may opt for non-intervention, and 
that this is also a matter of policy; on the verge of a paradox, it is 
often claimed that laissez faire is also a 'policy'. (11) Together 
with the previous points, all this has far-reaching consequences 
and implications. 'Policy' of 'policy-making' is a very peculiar type 
of activity. It does seem to have a specific relationship toward 
reality, while not possessing a reality, a separate existence on its 
own.
This point can be clarified if we compare policy to the classical 
definition of politics. Politics deals with the business of the city, 
the polis , the political community. There were a limited number 
of relatively well-defined matters that belonged to its scope. Other 
matters lay completely outside. Thus, for eg., in the framework of 
Aristotle, the very concept of 'political economy’ would not make 
sense. The matters of the polis and the business of the oikos were 
almost completely separate matters. But even concerning modern 
politics, the topics that are the central concerns of political science 
cover a fairly well-specified field (government, political parties, 
electoral system, conctitution, etc.). But 'policy' involves a specific 
relationship to all conceivable aspects of reality. There is economic 
policy, housing policy, health policy, etc. etc. The list can be 
continued without an end. Politics, on the other hand, was a 
separate reality. It was only dealing with a specific number or 
type of problems.
This point can also be supported by another argument, this time 
related to the concept of power. In most European languages, this 
word has two different, almost opposite meaning. 'Power' in 
common usage means control over actions, persons, things, the 



























































































to do, to accomplish, to carry through something. 'Political' power 
is obviously closer to the first of these meanings. But 'policy' 
power somehow shifts to the other side - at least this is the 
implication of the definition given by Roberts, according to which 
public policy is ’[a] set of interrelated decisions taken by a political 
actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the 
means of achieving them within a specified situation where these 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors 
to achieve' (12)
Policy, therefore, deals not with a separate sphere of affairs; it 
does not have a specific field. It is rather a specific type of 
relation to the world, a special intervention in the ordinary course 
of life. Perhaps this is the most important aspect of policy-making, 
drawing upon all elements of the definition mentioned earlier. 
Politics studies the way certain decisions are made, usually close 
to the top level; 'policies' start with the assumption that there is 
an ordinary course of affairs. 'Policies' intervene only in special 
cases. In this sense, policy is almost synonimous with the liberal 
concept of government, where the emphasis is on minimal 
government.
But, curiously enough, exactly at that point, it also becomes the 
opposite of the liberal world view. A key element of the latter is 
the separation of the public and the private. This separation is 
again central for both Aristotle and the Roman Law. However, 
when considering 'policies', this separation in certain sense 
bevomes irrelevant, undesirable, or meaningless. (13) Liberalism 
was concerned, among others, with the separation of politics and 
economics. It wanted to exclude political considerations, 
absolutistic methods of government from the inside of the 
(private) economic sphere. And so it succeeded, more or less. But 
this distinction no longer makes any sense if we consider the 
specific reality of 'policies', so separate or different from (even if 
not independent of) both politics and the law. It would be 





























































































4. The surprising familiarity of 'policy-making' in East Europe
This paper started with the difference between politics in East and 
West, and pointed out the specific, obsolete way 'politics' is 
interpreted by the new political elite in Hungary. An attempt was 
made to contrast it with the concept and reality of 'policies' or 
'policy-making', looking as different from East European politics as 
it would be possible. However, the more this analysis proceeded, 
the more surprising its results became. The concepts of 'policy' 
and 'policy-making', instead of providing a way to introduce the 
basics of modern, democratic politics into a place where these 
principles were lacking, sounded increasingly all-too familiar. The 
meaning and connotations of the concepts of 'policy', this specific 
reality of the modern state, seemed not at all democratic; quite 
the contrary, it rather covered a specific type of activity done by 
(or with the help of) experts, with the explicit aim of transforming 
reality, where the electorate, the purported subject of democratic 
politics, became an object of 'policies'. Thus, while politics may 
well have become restricted in the liberal state, put under the 
control of law, enforced by the separation of powers, and subject 
to democratic rules of the game, 'policy' at the same time begin to 
be involved with and extend to everywhere.
That is the reason for the proposition of the paper the description 
of the modem state as a 'policy-state', as opposed to concepts like 
the liberal idea of the night-watchman state' - something that 
may have had relevance to the programmes of the first half of the 
19th century; the idea of a 'class-state' - something that was close 
in certain ways to the reality of the second half of the 19th 
century; or the welfare state, that puts the emphasis only on one 
set of the problems covered. The latter term is also misleading, as 
it lays the blame for the increased scope of state activity solely on 
redistributive policies, while neglecting others policies that have 
the same scope and type of impact on daily life. Thus, one may 
say that for this discourse, laying all the blame of the welfare 
state solely, one can apply an otherwise often obsolete category: 



























































































distorting some genuine concerns with the spread of the 'policy 
state'.
Thus, though 'policy-making' seems to be the most natural, 
unobstrusive, and modern term, when closely looked at, reveals 
quite peculiar characteristics that on the one hand look obsolete, 
on the other, quite distant from both democratic politics and the 
mainstream of modern social and political thought, and close to a 
very different type of reality - the state party. Let's review here 
some of these properties.
One of the most surprising parts of contemporary definitions of 
'policy-making' are, on the one hand, the frequent, explicit 
reference to values, the impossibility and undesirability of a 
'positive' or 'positivistic' policy science; on the other, the direct 
reference to concepts like the common good, the public interest, or 
the 'good life'. Thus, according to Goodin, '[a]bove all, the policy 
sciences were to bring values back into the relentlessly positivistic 
disciplines from which they sprang'. (15) Lowi states about the 
importance of macro-level policy analysis that '[t]here does not 
seem to be any other way to get systematically closer to the 
ultimate questions of justice, equity, the good life. (16) According 
to Salisbury, most common usages of the term 'policy' have their 
source in Easton's definition: 'the authoritative allocation of values 
for the whole society'. (17) But the most telling view is again 
given by Lasswell, who said that the central focus of the 'new 
sciences' should be a 'concern with the shaping and sharing of all 
values'. (18)
These are terms that are certainly not used in the common 
language of modern poltical science or theory. Quite on the 
contrary, the modern sense of politics emphasizes its combative, 
partisan character. Politics involves the choice of parties, the 
struggle of interest groups, etc., where the only way to keep the 
struggle in control is to connect the mandates to elections, to 
voting, and the enforcement of the rule of law. Not so in 'policy'. 



























































































work of Anderson, who explicitly contrasts political values and 
policy values. (19)
One of the most preposterous commonplaces of Marxist 
philosophy was the dictum about the 'unity of theory and 
practice'. Certainly, nobody in political and social thought would 
risk a statement like that without becoming ridiculous. Yet, similar 
statements are proudly made in the policy sciences. (20) And 
according to Lasswell, the 'policy sciences' can directly contribute 
toward the 'ultimate goal' of democracy, which is 'the realization 
of human dignity in theory and practice' (21) Perhaps, these are 
just an empty truisms that can be said about anything anywhere. 
Still, it is worthwhile to point out that 'policies' operates at a level 
where such abstractions are thought to be still relevant.
In the same vein, while the central liberal concern is separation,
(22) and the contemporary sciences are moving toward 
specialisation, policy sciences proudly claim integration, linking, 
and unity. Thus, according to Lasswell again,' [t] he trend toward a 
policy sciences viewpoint... is a move away from fragmentation.
(23) Policy sciences should deal with aggregate problems; on the 
'subtle ties' that 'bind every part to the whole' (24)
Direct concern with the public good, the common interest, the 
maintenance of unity through delicate, subtle links, an attempt to 
shape the values of society present two different kind of 
problems. The first is concerned with the reasons for these 
activities, for the persistance or return of this so 'un-modern' set 
of concerns at the 'heart' of the present; and the second with the 
feasibility of such activities at the ground level. The literature on 
policy sciences give ample examples for both problems.
On the one hand, there are frequent references to very far- 
reaching purposes. The most common one is the question of 
'relevance'. Thus, according to Anderson, policy study is 'especially 
attractive to those who wish to be 'relevant', to engage in research 
and discovery that has some immediate social utility, (25) and 



























































































by Goodin. (26) There are two central elements in this view. 
Firstly, it implicitly opposes policy analysis to other, ’scholastic' 
academic topics. There are studies which are 'relevant', and which 
are not; the criteria for relevance being policy orientation. 
Secondly, in this view, studies that are concerned with policy­
making are almost synonyms with empirical studies, i.e. studies 
that are connected to actual, existing, empirical reality. Which 
again has two interesting conclusions. First, it conflates empirical 
reality and policy-making, when policy-making exactly represents 
a very specific attitude toward reality - the urge to change it in a 
uniform and centralised way. In the concept of 'policy' or 'policy­
relevant' analysis, the study and the alteration of reality become 
as if intertwined. Second, if we translate it into Hungarian, it has 
the strangely sounding implication that only 'political' research - 
i.e. research that has to do with 'political advice' has any 
relevance. Just when in East Europe social and political analysts 
are happy to separate themselves from political tutelage and 
immediate political concerns - or switch to politics from academia 
for good -, they are bound to face another attempt to re-define 
their work as either being irrelevant, or 'political' again - now in 
the sense of 'policy relevance'.
Besides the question of 'relevance', the literature also mentions 
other, even more explicit topics. In the programmatic book of 
Lemer and Lasswell, still considered to be the classic of the field, 
the point for the importance of policy analysis is put in a shocking 
language. According to Lasswell, '[t]he basic emphasis of the policy 
approach ... is upon the fundamental problems of man in society', 
and that the policy appraoch aims to concentrate energy on 
'fundamental and often neglected problems which arise in the 
adjustment of man in society'. (27) To solve these problems, there 
is a need for 'more significant information than we have had in 
the past about the thoughts and feelings of mankind. (28)
Lasswell is an outstanding, but not unique case in producing 
statements that somebody in East Europe cannothelp finding all 
too familiar. And not only there. Friedrich had this to say about 




























































































satisfaction on the part of the contributors with their own labors 
and those of their colleagues permeates the entire volume. 
Indeed, this writer has seldom been privileged to review the work 
of so enthusiastic a group of fellow workers. What is even more 
striking is the genuine confidence with which they look forward to 
an even better future ... '. (29)
At the level of the daily activity of policy-makers, we find more 
humbleness towards the problems faced, but also more perplexity 
towards the 'nature' of the task. Thus, according to Sir Charles 
Cunningham, who was once permanent under-secretary of state at 
the Home Office, 'policy is rather like the elephant - you recognise 
it when you see it but cannot easily define it.' (30) In the book of 
Hogwood, an even better example can be found. Almost 
paraphrasing some of the political instructors we interviewed in 
Hungary, a local authority education official is qouted for the 
following comment: 'It might help here to consider the question of 
what we actually mean by government policy. ... I confess that I 
am by no means sure what constitutes government policy, 
although for the last nine years of my professional life the matter 
has been of the utmost practical importance.' (31)
This was not the only surprising similarity between policy-makers 
and party instructors. Another example is concerned with the 
information collection - a central task of former party workers. 
Several of our respondents stated there that party workers had to 
gather all sorts of information, they had no right to neglect any 
information that may have had 'political' relevance. (32) 
According to a statement by Lasswell, quoted also by Hoss, 'where 
the needs of policy intelligence are uppermost, any item of 
knowledge, within or without the limits of the social disciplines, 
may be relevant. (33)
There is no need to proceed with these comparisons. The thrust of 
this whole section has been equivocal. The purposes and activities 
of the party apparatus are at crucial points almost identical with 
the supposed tasks of policy-makers and analysts - let's just 



























































































interests and destiny of mankind, the aim to transform reality, to 
alter the values of the population, the extremely broad range of 
the activities performed, and the attention to all possible pieces of 
information. The differences are, of course, also great in other 
dimensions. Besides the obvious differences in their surrounding 
reality (a difference that will persist at least until everything will 
have been shaped by 'policies'), let's just mention three more 
specific instances, because these are singled out in the literature: 
(34) the actual, detailed regulations, and the appointment of 
personnel do not belong to 'policy-making', while, at least in 
principle, decision-making was not part of the job of the party 
apparatus. All this may have been due to the lack of distinction 
between political and policy (and often even 'police') activities in 
the state party, their integration in one particular organisation. 
But the problem is still there: why this similarity, at the ground 
level, between the aspirations and activities of 'policy-making' 
and the state-party, in both cases exclusive of 'politics'?
This question cannot be answered within the limits of this paper. 
Only one piece of analysis will be mentioned shortly here, a line of 
investigation that goes back to the point only mentioned earlier - 
the fact that the word 'policy' only exists in English. What is the 
reason for this? Can it possible have any relevance for this topic?
The word 'policy' has its distant origins in the Greek word polis , 
meaning the city-state. This is a well-known fact. It is much less 
known that 'politics' and 'policy' has distinctively different 
immediate roots and historical trajectories. 'Politics' is connected 
to the Greek word politike , meaning the art of rule or 
government, while 'policy' to pollteia , which had a much more 
complex set of meanings. In the 16th century, the words 'police', 
'pollicie', or 'pollicy' were almost interchangeably used in both the 
continent and England. Their meaning was somewhat different 
from 'politic' or 'politique', even if the distinction was often 
blurred. It meant a set of regulations to be imposed; calculative 
action that was relevant to the common good; It was synonimous 
with 'government' or even the 'state'; and, in line with the original 




























































































'hot topic'. To give an example: when Thomas Starkey, a leading 
humanist of the age, returned from Italy in the 1530s, Cromwell 
gave him a task: write something out of your studies that has 
direct relevance for me. Starkey answered by writing a treatise, 
still in manuscript, entitled 'What is pollycy after the sentence of 
Aristotle?' (35)
It in only from the end of the 16th century that the meanings of 
the terms became different in the continent and in England. In the 
continent, the word takes up the form of 'police', and becomes 
more and more identified with a particular apparatus of 
government. In England, in the form of 'policy', it comes to be 
restricted to a peculiar form of governmental action, without 
being connected to a specific apparatus. (36) Nevertheless, the 
specific reality of 'policy-making' preserves much of the same 
methods or purposes as the one employed by the early-modern 
'police', and remained much different from 'politics'. Perhaps the 
specificity, and the real contribution of England to the emergence 
of modernity lies in not capitalism, the class society, or 
parliamentarism, but in the long gestation of the 'policy state'.
5. Concluding remarks
The political and social sciences - what else can they do - try to 
operate with clearcut dividing lines and well-defined categories. 
They try to separate the state from the economy, decision-making 
from the administration of decisions, society from government, 
the ruler from the ruled. However, in this way, the 
conceptualisation of the very interaction, link, connection between 
these categories is left out of the scope.
This omission is all the more problematic, since - as this article 
tried to show - it was exactly in these interstices that a new 
modality of government emerged in the modern states (perhaps 
even this made the modem state truly modern) and that was the 
idea of the 'policy' or 'policy-making'. Due to some reasons, this 




























































































and theory. Partly it was due to the fact that in continental 
languages - the strongholds of political philosophy - there was no 
separate category for this modality. Another reason is that the 
theory of state was a 'serious' matter, not supposed to be bothered 
with the minuscule matters of concrete 'policies' and 'policy- 
making'. As a result, in both critical theory and neo-liberal 
criticisms, the same partial concept of the state was reproduced. 
This 'state' was denounced from right and left alike as an external 
apparatus, a modem 'megamachine', overlooking the fact that the 
emperor was naked; that in moderal liberal democracies there 
was no overriding repressive apparatus controlling the population 
and colonising the life-world, but there were an infinite number 
of minor, recurrent policy processes that were much more flexible, 
but also, perhaps due to the same reason, all the more pervasive 
and dangerous that any theorist or administrator of the state ever 
imagined.
No matter what the neo-liberal paranoia says, it is not 'the state' 
or 'the government' whose despotism we should fear. But we must 
be aware of the fact that the subtle mechanisms, the specific 
rationality implied in policy-making takes over increasingly all 
aspects of human existence, presenting its own manners as the 
only rational way of action, connecting everybody and everything 
in its own peculiar way; perhaps not repressing anybody, but 
questioning the very right and reason to existence of anthing that 
cannot be managed or 'policied'.
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C. Were State and Civil Society Ever Identical?
The concept of civil society seems to have a peculiar endurance in 
East Europe. It is well known that in the 1980s, especially with 
the stimulus given by the application of this concept to Solidarity, 
it became one of the most popular slogans. (1) It was also widely 
stated immediately after the revolutionary changes of 1989 that 
this concept probably has no longer much relevance, as it was not 
particularly helpful in explaining and predicting the actual 
changes - the events did not follow the evolutionary logic of the 
'Big March'; and it was also thought that the term became obsolete 
either because the confrontation between the state and civil 
society was no longer an issue, or - from an opposite perspective, 
treating the use of this concept in the 1980s rather as an 
euphemism - because there was no longer a need to employ this 
term in lieu of-the concept of 'bourgeois society', in order to leave 
the problems of bourgeoisie and private property untouched. (2)
However, this was not to be the case. 'Civil society' stills seems to 
be a most popular concept. Moreover, while earlier this idea was 
not important in the (former?) Soviet Union, now it is taken up 
with a vengeance even there. (3)
But one must be cautious here. Let's not be deceived by the 
identity of words - this is not the same civil society. The reason 
for this is not to be searched solely in the disappearence of the 
enemy, the state-party or the political police. The re-definition 
was extended to the other side as well.
At one level, this is only a shift of emphasis. While previously the 
accent was on the second term - 'society', not in is rather on the 
first - 'civil', or 'civilised'. The opponent is no longer the state, it is 
rather the state of nature. (4) And this change is not merely 
cosmetic or lingustic. It is due rather to the disappearance of the 
former - alleged - unity of society. In the old discourse, recurse to 
'society' was a major way to legitimate opposition and dissent to 




























































































of 'society'. 'Society' was the real subject of political activity, even 
if due to the adverse conditions, this was a potential only, not 
realised in concrete activities. The new discourse of civil society is 
something completely different. Society became an object again - 
a target to be civilised.
This development is quite understandable, and is connected to 
real problems. It does not simply reflect the views of some 
segments of the former dissidents or 'quasi-dissidents' who 
became disappointed with the changes or with 'society'. The 
former discourse of civil society was idealistic and even 
ideological, not suitable for the reality of a 'society' that was 
heavily influenced and moulded by communism, even in the 
forms of counterstrategies and resistance. But, still, this idea of the 
'civilisation' of society carries a number of extremely dubious 
elements on its own - elements that are so close, among others, to 
the very project of bolshevism that it makes one question 
whether the proponents of these views have properly digested 
this experience.
Let's just list here a few questions:
1. To the analogy of the question of privatisation or re­
privatisation: is it supposed to be an 'original' civilisation or a re­
civilisation? Some claim that society as such did not exist in 
Hungary; (5) others, on the contraiy, referring for example to the 
work of Hankiss, (6) affirm that a full-blown civil society was 
destroyed here by the bolsheviks.
2. Who is talking here? What is the relationship between the 
subjects and objects of this civilising process? Do some people 
really think seriously that they have the right to sermon to 
others? Is the dividing line here according to social classes - that 
is, should it be the civilisation of the population by the 
intellectuals? But, then, were not intellectuals the kind of people 
who in one way or another could not avoid being among those 
who were most touched by the former communist systems? Is not 
this discourse just an excuse to avoid facing oneself - the real 




























































































way or another? Is it not just another method of searching for the 
problem in 'others'?
3. What are the supposed sanctions of this civilising mission? Will 
this be content with sermoning, which, as we all know, is not very 
effective, or does it intend to use other means? And if so, exactly 
what type? Can it be risked to say that, for eg. behind the current, 
impossible treatment of the issue of foreign debts, there is a 
lurking feeling among the new political elite that this can be 
considered as a just punishment for the past sins under 
bolshevism, the tacit contract between the population and the 
regime that as a recompense for the rising standard of living, the 
issue of democracy and freedom was as if swept under the 
carpet? This point may perhaps explain some of the differences in 
the current tones of the discussions and policies among Czecho­
slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
4. How is this 'civilising project' related to education? Is it only 
intended toward children, or should it be interpreted as a return 
to the project of civilising adults?
5. Is this civilising being done by private property, the idea being 
that anyone who owns property will be civilised by the inherent 
need for carefulness? But what will this do for the non-propertied 
classes? Will it happen in the region that after the resurrection of 
17-18th century theories and technologies of government, the 
principle of raison d'état and the apparatus of 'police' with the 
state-party, (7) and now the resurrection of early-19th century 
liberalism, will we repeat in the close future the discourses and 
confrontations of the mid-to-late 19th century?
6. Is this civilisation supposed to be an urbanisation - something 
that is close to the etymological meaning of 'civility'? Or, to give an 
identical, only Greek and not Roman reading, will it be a 'policing' 
- that was a synomim for 'civilisation' up to the mid-19th 
century? But did the proponents of the discourse of civil society 
consider seriously that one of the most intolerable aspects of the 
bolshevik systems was exactly their handling of the peasantry - 




























































































Instead of tackling these problems directly - something that 
seems to be a task that is almost by definition impossible this 
paper intends to discuss an analytical problem that has relevance 
to these issues as well. It is the question concerning the actual 
status of the separation of the state and civil society in the 
modern period - or rather their alleged former unity in the 
previous period.
X X X
The statement that the separation of state and civil society is a 
recent, modern phenomenon is one of the commonplaces in the 
literature on civil society. However, there is immediately 
something problematic with it as a starting point of an analysis. 
First, it is a pretense to neglect history. This idea justified the 
omission within the literature on civil society the relationship 
between politics and the social body before the end of the 18th 
century. Second, it is all-too Spencerian. There is some definite 
structuralist-functionalist evolutionism behind this view - the 
idea that there was something like the 'original unity' of state and 
society, a lack of distinction between the political and social 
sphere, a sign of backwardness that was broken down only by the 
emergence of the modern liberal-industrial world. Finally, 
underlining this perspective, the whole idea that the state and 
society were once identical gives a peculiar picture of 'ancient 
times', reinforcing whig beliefs concerning the pre-modern period 
as the rule of an omnipotent state, existing outside the law, etc. 
This framework thus helps to neglect the past, to reinforce 
prejudices about it, and therefore to misunderstood the specificity 
and the stakes of the emergence of the modern world.
Even if most references to this alleged primal unity are often 
quite unreflexive, there is a respectful tradition to which they 
may and do have recourse: the work of Manfred Riedel on the 
Hegelian concept of civil society. (8) In this case, we can't just talk 
about a side-remark. As a matter of fact, Riedel makes the 




























































































the central novelty and achievement of Hegel's political 
philosophy. It is by the realisation and theoretisation of this gap 
that Hegel can be truly considered as the founder of modern 
political philosophy; a thinker with clearer sight and more original 
and lasting vision than, for eg., Marx.
However, something still seems to be wrong with this scenario. In 
spite of all the historical and philosophical sophistication, this 
account in some of its basic characteristics is still too Spencerian - 
and, needless to say, Hegelian. We have here a historical fallacy - 
a taken for granted identification of certain developments of 
European society with the universal march of world history. And 
we have a highly questionable methodological assumption - a 
view of thinking as the reflexion of the 'great mind' upon the 
totality of human experiences, contemporary and historical, and 
then the grasping of the essence, the truth; the 'theoretisation' of 
the universal; a perspective that while seemingly gives an 
overblown, exaggerated role to thinking and the thinker, in actual 
fact reduces it to the putting into words, in the form of a 'perfect 
discourse', of events in the real that supposedly happened 
'outside' thought.
Certainly, something very significant has happened around the 
turn of the 19th century concerning the relations between 
political power and social acitlvites, daily life, and individual 
behavior. But it is highly questionable that this can be defined as 
'the' separation of 'the' society and 'the' state.
The purpose of the rest of this paper is to introduce some 
elements towards an alternative conceptualisation of this rift. It 
will not be along a Hegelian path, although it will neither be 
completely disconnected from Hegel. It will rather fit In the line of 
the analyses of Michel Foucault itself having a peculiar link with 
the tradition of Hegel. (9) The work of Foucault has not yet been 
seriously considered, apart from some Habermasian misreadings. 
(10) About this, only three short remarks. First, in the books 
analysed there, Foucault was never talking about civil society. 



























































































this concept in some of his lectures given at the end of the 1970s, 
and also returned to this point in a few essays and interviews. Due 
to lack of space, we cannot discuss this point here. (11) Second, 
the question of nihilism. This is a problem concerning the 
interpretation of Nietzsche and Foucault that reminds us of a game 
we encountered in our study of the party apparatus - it was called 
that 'the head of the messenger of bad news will be cut o ff. 
Nietzsche and Foucault were not nihilists; they were diagnosts. 
One may very well take issue with their diagnoses; they 
themselves modified and specified it on several occasions. But it is 
a grotesque error to charge, by a slipping, the - alleged - illness to 
the diagnost. Third, instead of the false issue of nihilism, what we 
have is a problem of intellectual conscience: the ability of 
questioning, at the proper moment, of one's own cherished beliefs; 
or, to the contrary, to need to take up a complacent refuge in some 
verbal juggling about a perfect, unquestionable ideal. (12)
What was then the problem behind this separation of state and 
civil society in theory and also in actual reality? For this, let’s 
review a work that was written some decades before and 
published some decades after the famous work of Hegel: The 
Limits o f State Action by Wilhelm von Humboldt. (13) A work 
that did not aim to represent a totality, that was only partly 
analytical and partly polemical and programmatic, but that 
nevertheless - or perhaps all the more so - pins down some of the 
central problems of the period.
This is a short book, and we will only make a few points. First of 
all, the title, which is quite revealing. The problem is the limit of 
the state action - it is about its boundary; about restriction in 
space. There is no question of abuses or illegitimate uses of state 
power; no consideration of the form and the art of government. 
Nothing is reminescent here of the concerns of Montesquieu with 
the spirits of the laws, the separation of powers in the sense of 
checks and balances - even if Montesquieu's work was 
complementary to Humboldt's, and served as an important 
background. And Humboldt is perfectly aware of the specificity 




























































































remarking that the definition of the sphere of the state's action is 
an important subject which has not yet been pursued so far, 
compared to other topics like the question of who shall govern 
and how. He also specifies the point of sensitivity, the source of 
this new problematisation of the state's activities: the problem is 
not tyranny, but welfare: or, to use the contemporary terminology, 
the 'welfare police'.
Second, the book effectuates a reorganisation on the whole 
question concerning the relations between politics and rights. 
Partly it is the same old - and very important - story of the shift 
of emphasis to individual rights, the defense of the equal rights of 
each and every individual, and the overriding concern that the 
only justification for the infringement of individual freedom is the 
freedom of other individuals - it should be of no surprise that on 
its 1851 publication, J. S. Mill gave such a welcome reception to 
this book. But there is more here. Humboldt's definition of the 
scope of political action does not merely represent an extension of 
rights, but also a corresponding reduction of politics to the 
restitution of such rights. The idea that the rights formerly 
restricted to the monarch are to be extended to each individual 
should be understood in a very literal sense. The point is not just 
equality before the law and the issue of human rights, but the 
extension of a restricted meaning of politics to each and every 
citizen. One aspect of the political activity of sovereign power in 
the past was the power of the sword, the original sense of the 
imperium  : the right to wield power against the infringers of 
sovereignty: the interpenetration of penal law and politics; a 
definition a crime as committed against the sovereign (whether it 
is the king or the republic), and therefore the task of punishment 
given as the restitution of the former situation. (14) Thus, 
Humboldt seems to imply the reduction of the sphere of state 
action to this particular instance of restitution, even if it is now 
extended to cover everybody. Which leads to the third point: 
related to this operation, Humboldt gives us a new target of 




























































































Which adds up to a strange definition: a reduction of political 
activity to what we now consider to be the activities and tasks of 
the police; an identification of politics and police. The argument is 
that because the 'state' became involved in too many activities, 
especially welfare-type and moralising activities, its scope must 
now be restricted; and this restriction means the 'depoliticisation' 
of society, which is identical with the reduction of political activity 
to the maintenance of security, i.e. to police activity.
But, interestingly enough, this is not the way Humboldt himself 
defines the police, even though 'police laws' are one of the areas 
that he considers to be central for the newly defined state, and 
begins the description of the proper sphere of state activity 
exactly by these 'police laws'. The definition is quite surprising, 
and different from what one would expect. It is given in the title 
of Ch. X. as 'solicitude of State for security with respect to actions 
which directly relate to the agents only', and in the text it is 
explicitly stated that it has nothing to do with what 'refers 
immediately to the rights of others'. (16) Police laws solely refer 
to the self or subjectivity, and not to relations between individuals 
or towards objects (properties). 'Police', in this sense is a matter of 
ethics, of ethical behavior. The next sentences explain a bit this 
peculiar use of the word: there the synonim of 'police laws' is 
given as 'preventive laws', and it is specified that such laws are 
related to the restriction of actions that may endanger the rights 
of others. 'Police', thus, is something like self-discipline, the 
internalisation of the norms of civilised behavior.
Let's stay here for a moment, at the peculiar relationship between 
the 'state' and the 'police'; a relationship that is all the more so 
interesting as it is well-known that the kind of 'state' towards 
which the discourse of civil society was developed by German 
liberals was exactly the contemporary polizeistaat . Let's have 
now a glimpse into this concept of 'police-state'.
Today, this concept is used exclusively in a pejorative sense, and 
is identified with the unlawful, violent abuses of state power. 




























































































the case in the past. (17) He distinguishes between two major 
types of police states: the traditional and the modern, totalitarian 
police states. In the latter case, he even makes a finer distinction 
between the modern police state (Germany between 1933 and 
1939), and the totalitarian police state (Germany, 1939-1945, 
with some additional remarks on Stalinism). In the case of the 
traditional police states, the Prussian polizei-staat or the 
Piedmontese or French ’police states', the term was not at all 
pejorative. The 'well-policed' state was rather an ideal. It stood for 
just, efficient, impersonal administration; public order, safety and 
tranquility; and a well-disciplined, prosperous, numerous and 
healty population.
However, in our view, there is much more in the concept and 
reality of the police state, in the specific and multiple links 
between 'state' and 'police' than the reestablishment of this 
distinction; something that does have contemporary relevance for 
both East and West. The term 'police state' can be used in other 
contexts, for other systems. First, obviously, there is room for a 
more thorough investigation concerning the application of this 
term to the reality of bolshevism. After all, protagonists in these 
countries applied this concept to their world, called communist 
systems 'police states' well before the idea of 'totalitarianism' 
gained currency. However, as opposed to the standard usage, on 
the basis of our empirical studies of the activity of the party 
apparatus, we would call bolshevik-type systems not simply 
totalitarian police-states - a term that certainly belies the type of 
reality we were living in from at least the 1960s to the 1980s -, 
but as a peculiar combination of both traditional and modern 
police states. Without going into details, we simply state that 
instead of identifying, or at least washing together the party 
apparatus and the secret police, it was the ambivalent, uneasy 
relationship between the two that was one of the 'dialectics' 
involved in the evolutions of these systems; a 'dialectics' that was 
due to this uneasy, incompatible combination of the coexistence of 
two apparatuses, two political techniques: the old-fashioned 
'welfare police' embodied in the party apparatus, and the modern 




























































































that belonged in its positivity to different periods in the 
development of Western states and societies. Thus, if the 
discourse of the civil society was first deployed in Germany 
against the traditional ’police state', it was re-deployed in East 
Europe in a quite analogous way against this peculiar combination 
of pre-modem and 'modem' police states. (18)
But there is another sense in which the concepts of state and 
police should be contrasted; this time related to the modern, 
liberal concept of the state. The liberal ideal of the state has two 
major characteristics. Firstly, negatively, concerning the manner of 
state activity, it is defined as a rechtstaat as opposed to the 
polizei-staat; it is a state that adheres to the rule of law. Secondly, 
positively, it is a 'minimal state', a 'nightwatch-man-state' where 
the activity of the state is reduced to the minimal possible scope: 
it is solely concerned with the maintenance of order and the 
upholding of the law. Combining the two definition, we may say 
that in a very specific sense that has nothing to do with a certain 
'leftist' discourse of the 1960s and 1970s, the liberal state is also a 
'police' or 'policing' state: a state whose activity is restricted to the 
police; or where, at least ideal-typically, there is a desire to reduce 
politics to policing - interpreted obviously in the modem sense. In 
the polizei-staat, the 'police' included the whole state, as far as 
internal matters and organisation were concerned; it extended to 
all sorts of activities, and stood outside the law. In the liberal 
state, the activities of the police became much more restricted, 
and - at least under ideal conditions - firmly under the control of 
the law. But the same identity between state and police was 
maintained; the same identification of politics and police. This 
point is clear in the work of Humboldt, but can also be found, and 
in a much more elaborate theoretical form in the political theory 
of Weber. After all, does not Weber consider the central 
characteristics of the state being the monopolisation of the 
legitimate use of force - something that clearly is almost identical 




























































































In sum, liberalism has a specific sensitivity, a strong a fear 
towards the police state - something that nobody is seriously 
questioning today. But beyond this, there is a peculiar, more or 
less hidden assumption: the identification of politics and 'police'. 
The corollaiy of all this is a generalised mistrust, fear of politics, a 
peculiar reaffirmation of the both the Christian and stoic 
reservation against politics, a perspective quite different from the 
Greek ideal; a perspective that, surprisingly enough, has a strong 
parallel in socialist thought: in the socialist utopia of the withering 
away of the state, in the bolshevik (or socialist?) dislike of all 
conflicts and problems, and therefore the denial of the need for 
politics in an ideal system - the only difference being that the 
ideal is liberal democracy for liberals, and socialist democracy for 
socialists. (20) Also, it is against this perspective that two major 
contemporary critical movements, reaffirmations of politics are 
rooted: a return to the civic tradition (from a new conservative 
perspective), and a reaffirmation of the civil society as a political 
concept (from a new socialists perspective). (21) Both are 
discourses of the 'good', discourses against which it is hard to 
voice reservations on principle, but that seem to neglect some 
problems concerning both the possibility and the desirability of 
the realisation of their ideal, in our contemporary world..They try 
to resurrect ideals in their purity which are quite noble, but 
without taking into account the fact that on the one hand, there 
must have been some reason for their disappearance; on the 
other, that as they - at least to some extent - become parts and 
parcels of our modern reality, there may be dangers concerning 
their resurrection.
Returning to the liberal mistrust of politics, one may be justified 
in having certain doubts concerning the liberal horror of 
government. There is something peculiar about the fact that while 
liberalism tries to criticise government, to restrict the activity of 
the state in the last 200 years, and is very much the dominant 
principle of contemporary government, nevertheless the specter 
of the state does not stop raising its head time and again. Our 
purpose is not to play the tune of the spread of rationalisation and 



























































































matters, but at any rate to be suspicious about the claim that the 
activity of government, interpreted in the wide sense, is 
decreasing under liberal systems. (22) Can we not say that the 
recurrent liberal attacks against the monster of the state - a real 
threat in many parts of the world - serve also to distract attention 
from the very real and specific methods, techniques, and 
rationalities of government applied in liberal systems?
These remarks open the road toward two possible paths of 
analysis. One is the actual study of a peculiar reality under liberal 
systems: policy-making. This would involve a direction of research 
that instead of trying to come up with a general theory of the 
'state', would be analysing the specificity of this 'policy-state'. We 
pursue this line in an other paper. (23) The second is a more 
detailed analytical account of the question of the relationship 
between politics and police - a question that has relevance for the 
analysis of 'policy', as well as for the question of the civil society - 
state distinction.
Let's return, then, to the question of the difference betweeen and 
identity of state (or politics) and civil society. On the one hand, we 
have here an uninteresting lingustic point. In both the Greek and 
Roman tradition, the terms that describe politics, or political 
activity, are derived from the respective word for 'urban 
settlement': polis and civitas . Thus, the identity of political and 
civil society that can be found, for example, in the works of 
Hobbes or Locke reflect nothing but the interchangeable use of the 
Greek and Latin terms.
On the other hand, however, the Greek term polis has a number 
of different derivatives that have played an important role in 
both Greek political life and theory, and had important trajectories 
in Western political history. It is a much more interesting, and not 
solely linguistic question. It has relevance, among other things, for 
the distinction between 'politics' and 'police'. In spite of the 
problem of the confusion concerning their difference and identity 
that was pointed out in this paper, and their similar derivation 




























































































distinct. The origin of the first is the Greek term politike, standing 
for the art of rule or government. It is addressing the question of 
how to rule a political society. The other term, politeia , is dealing 
with a much more disparate set of issues. Let's give a detailed 
definition this concept, all the more so as even if this was a central 
concept for Greek political theory, it importance was somewhat 
lost in the later period, in spite of all references to the Greek ideal 
of democracy. (24)
First of all, politeia embodies something like the constitution, the 
form of government for the Greeks. It includes the definition, the 
criteria of citizenship. It refers to the formal rules of the games, 
the mutuality of duties and obligations. Second, it has a more 
concrete sense, related to the citizen body itself. It does not mean 
simply the concrete, numerical sum of citizens, for which the 
Greeks had another term (politeuma ). Rather, it referred to the 
specific ensemble, of 'togetherness' of citizens, citizenship as an 
ethical way of life; it included considerations about the education 
of citizens, the education for citizenship; and finally, it was 
considered as the daily (public) activity of the city, and all 
military considerations were omitted from the term. Third, it 
stood for something more specific: the actual organisation of 
government, techniques for the distribution and assessment of 
offices, the concrete setting up of the governing bodies of the polis 
. Finally, it had a much more general and vague meaning; a 
meaning that was nevertheless the most crucial of all: politeia 
stood for the soul of the city, the vital, binding links between the 
citizens and the polis. In a sense that lies exactly in the line of 
classical Greek philosophy and its tradition - perhaps even giving 
the specificity of this tradition -, politeia was the essence of the 
polis.
Both the difference between the two terms and their importance 
for classical Greek theory is not our invention. It is there in the 
standard classical texts. Actually, the titles of the two most read 
Greek political works bear witnesses to this difference. The work 
political work of Plato is called Politeia (translated as 'Republic' or 



























































































Aristotle is called Politikon (translated as Politics). This difference 
is not accidental. The work of Aristotle is closer to modern, 
'positivistic' view of politics, as the study of the forms and 
techniques of rule or government, while Plato is more concerned 
with the living spirit, the ethos of the city. It is also well known 
that for Hegel, Plato was a much more important thinker than 
Aristotle. In light of all this, it simply defies understanding why it 
happens that this distinction has so far been mostly lost not only 
in the literature on civil society and the state, but in political 
theory and philosophy in general. In Riedel's piece on Hegel, even 
if it abound in original Greek and Latin words, the term politeia is 
mentioned only in the closing pages, more as a lingering problem 
that can't be avoided in connection with Hegel's use of the concept 
of police, and not as a central question on its own right.
x x x
So far, one may say, all this is just a matter of historical interest; 
some obscure points about the history of classical Greek political 
thought. But, in our view, something more is involved here; 
something that may well turn out to be quite important for the 
understanding of the emergence and stakes of the modern links 
between the political and social spheres. As the relations between 
'politics' and 'police' played a crucial part, a key episode in the 
manifold ways 'politics' and 'society' were connected and 
disconnected throughout the 16-19th centuries.
This story is obviously impossible to treat in a single paper, but 
some points must be made along a quite long historical period in 
order to situate the problem of the separation of state and civil 
society around the turn of the 19th century. First, we have to go 
back again in time in order to make a few points about the 
medieval period.
The meaning of 'politics' in medieval times does not present a 
problem for us here, as there was a significant continuity in the 




























































































other hand, in medieval Europe, there was nothing ressembling to 
the idea of politeia . Moreover, there was something both in the 
medieval ideal and practice of doing politics that was completely 
different from and even hostile to this Greek concept. The 
medieval way of doing politics was based on two key elements, 
both different from each other and from the Greek model. One 
was the Christian view, hostile toward politics as a matter of 
principle - a hostility that originated perhaps in the Hebrew 
experience of the Babylonian captivity; a rejection of the cruelty 
and the threatening, war-like character of ancient civilisation that 
can also be found in the other axial religions and philosophies 
around the same time; (25) a perspective that found its clearest 
exposition in the work of Augustinus that had such a large impact 
on medieval politics. The view concerning the relations between 
ethics and politics inherent in this perspective was the opposite of 
the Greek ideal. Political life was not a source of ethical conduct, 
nor the sphere of ethical action, but one of power, greed, violence, 
abuse, temptation. Instead of positing ethics as being internal to 
politics, it concentrated on religion, morality, and laws, in order to 
provide external controls on politics.
The target, the subject of medieval treatments of politics was not 
the citizen, but the ruler. The aim was to attain his compliance to 
higher ethical principles. Christianity also introduced another 
consideration quite alien from the Greek world of politics: a task 
of the ruler being to care about the well-being of his subjects in 
an individualised manner; at least as a matter of principle.
The other model provided a different type of check on political 
power. It was the feudal technique of representation. The point 
concerning specificity of this technique of representation was 
recently made by Alessandro Pizzorno who, among other things, 
called attention to a widespread misreadings concerning the 
origins of modern democracy: its all-too-easy identification with 
the Greek ideal, and the neglect of the feudal representative 
tradition. (26) According to Pizzorno, modern representative 
democracy has much more to do with the feudal than with the 



























































































way of controlling central power and connecting the center and 
localities, without having recourse to religious, ethical or moral 
claims.
The difference of and the tension between these two principle was 
as much in the center of 'politics' in the middle ages as the much 
better known struggle between spiritual and temporal power. 
Though the Greek idea of the politeia was missing from the feudal 
manner of government, it did survive, through Roman mediation 
and combined with the principles of the Roman law, in medieval 
cities and city states, making the link between the representative 
and politeia principle in these cities a potentially interesting field 
of study. The Renaissance, at least according to the 'civic humanist' 
interpretation, (27) was to a large extent nothing but the re­
discovery of this ancient, 'pagan' principle. One may even risk to 
propose an interpretation of Machiavelli along these lines. His 
concept of the virtù can be considered as the transposition of the 
Greek ideal of politics as ethics into a feudal Christian setting, into 
the person of the prince. As it is well known, Machiavelli's genre 
was the Christian treatment of politics: a mirror to the prince, 
even if he blew up the constraint of the genre; and not just the 
genre was the same, but the target of intervention as well: the 
Prince. It was the technique and the ideal, the 'ethical substance' 
of political action that was Greek. It should not be surprising that 
the principles proved to be incompatible, unworkable.
So far, this is still only an historical analysis. But it serves two 
practical purposes for the paper. Firstly, it prepares the ground 
for the analysis of the introduction of the Greek concept of politeia 
into this field of reality. Second, it also helps to underline the 
point that it does not make much sense in talking about the 
identity of state and civil society in feudal Europe - first of all, 
because it is highly questionable whether something like the 
'state' or 'civil society' existed at all at that time. This point can 
also be made by an analysis of the history of the term 'state': in 
the middle ages, it refered solely to the private domain of the 



























































































kind of aggregation of the whole population; and 'civil' - meaning 
public, in one way or another. (28)
It is well-known that the 15-16th centuries were the times of the 
waning of the Middle Ages, the break-up of the medieval order. It 
was also stated recently that a helpful way to characterise this 
period is through the growth of princely power. (29) We would 
only like to make one point here; that as one of the attempts to 
deal with this problem, the Greek ideal of politeia was suddenly 
reintroduced into European political thought. Here, just a short 
example will be mentioned, the work of Seyssel; a work that sheds 
some light on the peculiar way Christian, representative, and 
Greek concepts were joined in the period. (30)
Claude de Seyssel does not belong to the well-known names in the 
history of political thought, but he is not forgotten either. In the 
literature on the history of 16th century political thought, he is 
considered as the starting point of all accounts of modem French 
constitutionalism. He gives at once a synthesis of medieval 
constitutionalism, and a glimpse toward modern constitutional 
theories. In introductions to his work, la police figures as one of 
the three constitutional checks or bridles on the absolute power of 
the prince, alongside with religion and justice. (31) In general 
terms, it refers to the complex network of feudal rights and 
obligations which no monarch can overstep; at least, not without 
potentially disastrous consequences. In this sense, la police is 
nothing but a new word given to the feudal system of 
representation and monarchy.
But all this discussion is restricted to Part I of the work, neglecting 
the more perplexing considerations of the remaining four sections. 
Here, la police refers not only to customs and laws as the existing 
state of affairs, as given checks on the power of the prince, but as 
targets to be maintained or conserved. The exact purpose of the 
intervention is not defined clearly, but is related to the 
maintenance and growth of the monarchy. In one sense, it was 
just a reinforcement of the feudal ideal. But this went well beyond 




























































































defense and justice. The specific, detailed points in the remaining 
sections of the book make it obvious that la police referred here 
to the regular task of the safeguarding of the whole social 
structure and way of life, the society of estates, against threats 
from the inside, and not only defense against occasional external 
transgressors.
Seyssel's work is just an example - and a fairly early one - of the 
series of attempts made in the 16th century to control a political 
power that seemed to have lost all control; that, as Machiavelli 
discovered it, became independent. One attempt was return to the 
old methods that proved to be inefficient: religion and the law. In 
one reading of history, this attempt was characterised by 
centuries of failures, only to succeed, suddenly, with the birth and 
victory of liberalism. But there is an other possible reading of this 
political history; a less noble, much misunderstood, but perhaps 
more effective one. This focuses on the theory of raison d 'état , 
understood in the 16-17th century not in a pejorative sense, but 
as a theory of how to place the art of government on a rational 
basis as opposed to the tyranny of the personal interest of the 
prince; a quest for the internal rationality of state action, that was 
found in the principle of the growth of the forces fo the state. (32) 
This led to a novel way of conceptualising the tasks of the prince 
and the state - redefining the prince's search for self-interest as a 
positive principle and not an abuse of rule; and the links between 
sovereign power and society - by involving the 'state' in the daily 
activity of the population at large. In order to assure the growth 
of the forces of the state, the population had to be maintained, 
cared for, 'civilised', or, to use the contemporary term, 'policed'. 
These two novelties were parallel processes, starting from the two 
ends of a gap; a gap that was enormous in the feudal period 
between the central political power and the subjects, the 
'population': on the one hand, the extension of the 'state' to cover 
the whole body politic, the whole citizenry, and not just the 
private domain of the king or the central apparatus; on the other, 
the inclusion of the daily activities of the population among the 
concerns of sovereign power. This is the process of the 




























































































interest of the monarch - posited as being identical with the 
interests of the whole state - with the interests of each and every 
citizen, on the basis of the alleged truism that after all, the health 
and wealth of the population is the main target of both the prince 
and each and every one of his subjects. Instead of the identity of 
state and civil society as an original condition, a historical 
universal, we have rather the identification of state (the 'police- 
state') and civil society as a target, a project.
At the end of the 18th century, at the period of Enlightened 
absolutism, for a fleeting moment there was a considerable belief 
that this project may indeed succeed. Let us introduce here a last 
additional concrete reference that will help us both to illustrate 
this point and also to return to the book of Humboldt, in order to 
better situate it. This is the work of Justi, the greatest theoretician 
of the Polizeiwissenschaft, the contemporary science of police, 
and the emphasis will be on the interpretation of the shift 
between Justi and his most important follower, Sonnenfels. They 
all wrote in the same period, in the last half of the 18th century, 
and were almost contemporaries of Humboldt. Their major 
problem, like Humboldt's, concerned the links between state and 
society, politics and police. None of them tried to establish an 
identity of all these terms. But the links between them were 
thought of in thoroughly different ways. (33)
Justi, on the one hand, makes a clear distinction between the 
respective tasks of politics and police - a distinction which, he 
claims, was so far neglected, creating a lot of confusion in the field 
of political and police sciences. In a way, the tendency of this 
distinction is identical with the way we would separate 'police' 
and 'politics': one should only deal with 'negative' matters, 
questions of defense and security, while the other has more 
'positive', problem-solving-type tasks. But he identifies the 
respective spheres in exactly the opposite manner as we would 
have: for Justi, it is politics which has a solely negative sense, 




























































































The concrete tasks Justi assigns to the ’police' are extremely 
broad. It involves practically anything we consider a social or 
economic activity, and beyond, concerning even 'private' methods 
of behavior control. As he says in almost as many words, the 
major target of the police is society itself - man as a social being. 
What Justi has in mind is not just a force outside society that is 
supposed to control and supervise it, but that police and society 
are almost coextensive terms - synonims. The fact that there is a 
need for a separate police apparatus is only an indication of 
backwardness, the sign that the state of affairs is still far from 
being ideal. In the end, a truly successful police will eliminate 
itself. (34) This is the dream of the identity of 'police' and society; 
an identity that still leaves a certain sphere of politics and state 
action separate and intact.
Justi is the 'fulfilment' of the 'destiny' of Polizeiwissenschaft, of 
almost two centuries of attempts trying to define to true object of 
this new reality, the 'police'. His immediate follower, Sonnenfels 
suddenly claimed that the whole effort besides the point. In his 
view, there was no need to to give a sufficiently broad definition 
to 'police'. The problem lay exactly with this very attempt. The 
desire to provide a comprehensive, broad definition was 
something like chasing a mirage. Sonnenfels made a Don Quijote 
out of Justi. Instead, he gave a restricted, negative definition; the 
police was to concern itself with prevention. Instead of producing 
all sorts of goods, it should rather deal solely with the prevention 
of bad. (35)
This change left the separation between 'politics' and 'society', 
understood as the central decision-making organs and the daily 
life of the majority of the population, intact But it completely re­
located the place of the police in this game. Instead of belonging to 
the field of society, becoming - under ideal circumstances - at one 
with it (in a sense truly advancing the Hegelian concept of 
aufgehoben ), it was suddenly relocated to the field of politics. 
And while the earlier problem was concerned with the relations 
between police and society - the maintenance of order, discipline, 




























































































to everyday perceptions and morality, closely integrated to social 
forms and structures -, now the question becomes the relation 
between the politics and police, pointing toward the liberal 
problématisation of the limits of politics, of the state, the 
réintroduction of the question of law concerning the police, a 
concern that gave support at the level of philosophy and law to 
voices raised at the level of daily life against the police by earlier 
'libertines'. In a way, the French revolution symbolised so 
powerfully this newly found unity: (36) the unity between the 
philosophers and politicians fighting the monarchy (high-level 
absolutism) and the 'common men' of the third estate struggling 
against the police (everyday absolutism); a development that is 
not without parallels with contemporary events in East Europe. 
And perhaps in the line of this investigation, another parallel 
between the French revolution and bolshevism can also be better 
understood - the spell-binding link between the republican 
idealism and the kind of 'police terror1 involved in Jacobinism, and 
in general in the Rousseauite tradition.
The police, even if it tried to become internal to and at one with 
society, remained and was finally rejected (at least in its original 
form) as an external body. Its main concerns were explicit 
moralisation, sermoning, disciplining. The whole concept of civil 
society was deployed as an opposition to the moral and welfare 
police. Still, in many ways, we can also find persistances and 
continuities. This development can be well compared to the 
transition from the 'mirror-of-princes' literature to theories of 
raison d'état - the end of moralisation, the binding of individuals 
by their own interest, redefining the principle of self-interest the 
principle of order from that of disorder. Even if the original 
policing project did fall into pieces, his elements did survive in a 
different form in liberal societies as well - in decentralised and no 
longer centralised manner, like the case of the delegation of 
policing authority to individual enterprises, on the basis of the 
idea that there is better 'on-the-spot' knowledge of individual 
circumstances; (37) or by changing the objects of 'policing' or 
'civilising', the main target being no longer the whole social body 




























































































were not yet civilised, not yet part of civil society, either because 
of their age or their marginal behavior or characteristics.
Civil society was an effective solution in a concrete historical 
setting. It was also almost immediately considered as a travesty of 
the principles - and with some degree of justification. It was 
claimed that it promoted egoistic individualism to the detriment 
of ethics and community. With this, a new game was introduced 
into the field of political thinking, the antagonism of liberalism, 
conservativism and socialism: the concrete reality of liberal, 
bourgeois civil society opposed to the travesty of the police state, 
neglecting, or rather not being able to think of itself as a partial 
inheritor of the original, traditional policing project; and the 
opposition to the betrayal of principles by this very bourgeois 
civil society, with the recurrent attempts of trying to resurrect the 
true Greek ideal, not being able on its own to think the links 
between the Greek ideal and the history of the early-modern and 
modern police. It is perhaps this game, especially the game 
between liberalism and Marxism or socialism that prevented for 
such a long time to 'discover' the peculiar fate associated with this 
ideal of politeia.
X X X
The concept of the civil society is an uneasy, unstable discursive 
programme. It cannot but oscillate, since its inception - or rather 
since the instrumentalisation of the politeia as a 'police' as a tool 
of social disciplining and civilisation- endlessly between two 
extremes: on the one hand, the affirmation of the irreducible 
reality of 'society' as a fact and also a major source value; on the 
other, the reaffirmation of the programme to create, to mould this 
reality into a proper, 'civilised' shape. Its stability was gained only 
by reference to a self - the incalculation of self-interest, and the 
related concepts of self-disciplining, self-control, self-government, 
etc. But the form of subjectivity thus reaffirmed is not 
independent of the former civilising projects, as the major target 




























































































individuality. Ancient civilisation may well have presented the 
image of an irresistible, alien mega-machine. (38) But the danger 
involved in modern civilisation is not simply the threat of a 
totalising state, but is related to the long project of the 
development of an 'individualising power'. (39)
The current changes in East Europe perhaps represent an 
invitation to think again the links between politics and society, in 
order to create new forms of government, beyond liberalism and 
socialism, while not neglecting the basic values of each of the 
approaches: some of the answers of liberalism - human rights, the 
rule of law, the respect for personality and freedom, for eg. on the 
one hand, and some of the questions of 'socialism' - concern with 
the chances of others, inequality, poverty, etc. on the other -, but 
also think and make something new. Without neglecting the fact 
that this may be an opening that is impossible to realise.
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D. Discipline and Govern: The Transition in East Europe 
and Languages of Power
1. Introduction
Besides the grave economic, social, political, cultural and other 
problems that all countries have to face in the region, the fact and 
circumstances of the transition and the current situation in the 
former Eastern Europe presents a number of problems and 
surprises for social and political thought and analysis as well. Such 
is first of all the question of how these changes could have 
happened at all, and especially in this particular way - a question 
that does not stop perplexing those who lived in or followed 
closely the path of these systems. Second, there is the problem of 
the discourse, the language itself that is applied to the transition 
and the nature of the former system both by analysts and 
protagonists - social and political scientists, journalists, and 
politicians; a language emphasizing dictatorship, repression, and 
totalitarianism, where the paradox is exactly that if this language 
were correct, the transition could not have happened in the way it 
actually did, at least in Hungary. This language is motivated on the 
one hand more by an urge to write out ideas that were formerly 
impossible to get into print than by considerations of clear- 
minded analysis - a situation that is understandable on the basis 
of psychology, but that is unacceptable for analytic purposes; on 
the other, by the implicit or explicit (often - especially in case of 
the new 'populist' leaders - cynical) desire of the new political 
elite to secure their legitimacy. For anybody who had a first-hand 
experience of the events of the last 3-4 years in Hungary, a 
discourse that talks about the downfall of a tyranny simply does 
not make any sense.
Third, there are some considerable problems with the language of 
contemporary political and intellectual programmes of the region. 
On the one hand, we have a resurrection of the idea of 



























































































Eastern Europe - liberal, neo-liberal, nationalist or other 
politicians, intellectuals, businessmen, social administrators and 
social scientists. The discourse of 'modernisation' seems an almost 
natural answer to the current sets of problems. However, two 
points are lost or forgotten in this discursive euphoria - two 
historical experiences. Firstly, that after a similar upsurge of 
modernisation theories in the 1950s, this concept became much 
discredited later. The times and places may well have been 
different then and now, but a neglect of the possible analogies is 
still not justified. Secondly, it is also quite forgotten that 
bolshevism, after all, was exactly an overall programme for 
modernisation. It is true that the ideology and the means chosen 
were different, and also that reality became quite different from 
the original dreams. Still, beyond ideology, it is not at all certain 
that all techniques are so dissimilar. There is also the danger that 
reality will be different from the programme again, and in 
perhaps surprising ways.
On the other hand, there is some problem with the almost 
consensual view concerning the manner of 'modernisation', the 
new slogans of the day. These are everywhere the same: market 
economy, private property, civil society, etc. We certainly do not 
want to question the relevance of all these considerations. Still, 
there is reason to find fault with a discourse and attitude that in 
its sensitivity does not seriously go beyond an early-19th century 
perspective. First, intellectually, because too much things have 
happened since that time to make the adherence to a strict, 
dogmatic liberalism an intellectually unsatisfactory attitude. (1) 
The second point is related to actual social and political problems. 
After all, even if bolshevism - perhaps even socialism tout court - 
proved to be a failure as an answer, it does not deny the validity 
and seriousness of the problems which provoked these answers; 
problems that certainly will be a part of daily reality in these 
countries for a long time (unemployment, poverty, declassation, 
insecurity, large and according to everyday perception 




























































































In this context, it is to be remarked that these discourses did not 
originate in the events of 1989 and 1990. One can refer to a much 
longer conceptual impasse. On the one hand, scientific discussions 
between East and West often took up a fruitless scenario in the 
past decade or so when the Eastern delegate was no longer 
distinguishable and peculiar by his Marxist rhetoric, but by his 
boundless admiration for the wonders of modernisation, the 
market and related matters; and his Western opponents were no 
longer pointing out the failures of socialism, but were trying to 
give often quasi-paternalistic, and always very general and broad 
advices about the dangers of the market, private property, etc. 
etc. On the other hand, this discourse of modernisation, the market 
and civil society is hardly different from the language used by the 
'late' reform commmunists. Of course, the references concerning 
the need for socialism or the Party are now omitted - but reform 
communists may easily point out that the possibilities are now 
different than they were then. All things considered, there is 
something really perplexing about the fact that the current 
discourse of the new democracies of East Europe displays so few 
really new ideas - except for the fact that some elements of the 
nationalistic and religious 'revivals' were completely unforeseen 
by the different 'reformist' intellectual scenarios.
Finally, there is the problem of the legacy of communism as an 
analytical issue, the survival of the effects of the past system in 
reality - in daily life, social and personal relationships, individual 
attitudes and behavior. There is a real need to analyse post­
communism beyond the rhetorics of daily politics and journalism, 
especially because if there was any point in the discourse of 
totalitarianism, it should indicate that the impact of such a 
thorough system of control cannot so simply disappear into thin 
air.
2, The discourse of the transition
The radical changes that were happening in East Europe in 1989 




























































































for most observers, both East and West. However, given the 
enormous curiosity and the need for understanding, there soon 
developed a dominant orthodoxy concerning the reasons. While 
the former theoretical frameworks seemed to be incapable of 
making sense of an event that counterdicted their basic axioms, 
the new interpretations were nevertheless based to a large extent 
on these very theories.
In a very rudimentary way, this orthodoxy can be characterised 
in the following way. These societies lived under a totalitarian (or 
post-totalitarian) dictatorship, where the repressive and 
illegitimate power of the communist parties were maintained by 
the external force of the Soviet army. This system was claimed to 
be unique, far from the mainstream of modern history and 
development; it was a Russian aberration. It was an oppressive, 
monolithic block, impossible to change from within, impossible to 
challenge from without.
Nevertheless, these systems collapsed, and the reason can be 
summarised in one word: Gorbachev. Due to certain reasons, 
Gorbachev decided to lift the lid, to declare unilaterally the 
Brezhnev-doctrine and the Yalta pact invalid. This liberated the 
spirit from the bottle, the oppressed people have arisen 
everywhere, the communist systems collapsed, the road was 
opened towards freedom and democracy. The difference in the 
respective countries was only in the timing of the changes, and it 
was due to previous attitude toward reforms, and the 
responsiveness of communist leaders to the spirit of the times.
This explanation that is all too journalistic, putting too much 
emphasis on one personality - a solution that is certainly most 
unsatisfactory according to the current views in the social and 
political sciences and even in history - is usually complemented 
with another, opposite explanation, the reference to the economic 
crisis. If the first explanation was 'subjective', this is certainly 
'objective', structuralist-functionalist. The two views nicely 
complement each other, they together form a firm web. The fall of 




























































































of economic life; and they happened now because this was the 
time when a man came who realised the problem and had the 
courage and the vision to act; a man with whom is was 'possible to 
do business with'. Objectivity and subjectivity form a coherent 
theory that seems to be inassailable.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge the exclusivity of this 
scenario, both concerning the nature of the past systems and the 
reasons for their downfall, in order to contribute to a different 
understanding; in order to tackle some problems of the transition 
that the above framework was not be able to situate.
Firstly, no matter how obvious it seems first problems of fact. It is 
obviously true that there was a deep economic crisis in these 
systems; but that was the case since the beginning. It would 
especially be a mistake to project backwards the current 
decreases in GNP as the origin of the whole upheaval - a mistake 
often committed by economists. And the very nature of this crisis 
- the question whether it was an 'economic' crisis - does present 
an intellectual problem.
The prolonged economic problems of these systems are facts. But 
to explain the collapse of these systems as a consequence of an 
economic crisis is a mistake of thinking. One has to be careful with 
words. The term 'economic crisis' is misleading, as it is employed 
as a terminus technicus for the description of an internal process 
of modem capitalist market economies, referring to the periodical 
crises of the economy, the regularly returning event of a decrease 
of output, or at least a radical decline in the growth of the GNP. 
This was something that obviously did not happen in this form in 
the centrally planned economies for long decades.
This fact, by the way, gave rise in Hungary to a considerable 
literature in the last decade on the existence of cyclical 
phenomena in the economic system. Economists, on the basis of 
the 'theory', were searching for cyclical phenomena, and not 
without success. Such a cyclicality was in fact discovered in the 




























































































five-year planning system. (2) However, another line of 
investigation led to a perhaps more interesting result. This was 
the project of Maria Csanadi that also started as an investigation 
of the reason for irregularities concerning the allocation of 
investment funds, but which led completely outside the sphere of 
economics: into the Central Committee of the party itself. Csanadi 
found that there was one variable that showed extremely strong 
correlation between the amount of money firms received in 
particular periods; and the was linked to CC membership. Thus, it 
was this economic investigation that led to one of the few 
empirical studies of the party. (3)
The point here is not to deny the fact that there may have been 
cyclical phenomena associated with the path of the economic 
system under existing socialism, nor to deny the relevance and 
validity of such studies. It is rather a question of perspective or 
logic; the aim is to question an attitude that is trying to apply the 
same logic to every phenomena; that in order to convince itself of 
its own explanatory strength, needs to assume and transpose 
identical - economic - mechanisms everywhere.
But there is another inherent weaknesses of any economic 
explanations of the dismantling of communism. In order to talk 
about the self-contained existence of an economic crisis, it is 
necessary that 'the economy' as such exist. It is the contention of 
this paper that in the formely existing socialist systems there was 
no such thing as 'the economy'.
This statement is not so paradoxical or new as it sounds. On the 
basis of the work of Braudel (in a direction opposite to the one 
taken up by Wallerstein, using, among others, the works of 
Foucault, Furet, Hirschman and Pocock), it was recently stated by 
a new generation of French intellectual historians that 'the 
economy' is a recent invention; it can be connected to the 
emergence of liberalism. Stretching the point just a little bit, one 
could say that Adam Smith single-handedly discovered 'the 
economy'. (4) This invention was an answer to a specific problem. 




























































































The 'economy' was discovered as a solution to a political problem; 
the solution of a crisis of government, of governmental rationality.
In this scenario, the 'economy' emerged as a solution to a political 
problem. In the East European countries, the problem, at first 
sight, was exactly the opposite. There, it was due to political and 
ideological considerations that the logic of the economy was 
neglected, denied. Still, what both cases have in common, and 
what therefore can be a promising starting point, is the indexing 
of the 'economy' - in the sense of a political economy - to the 
political sphere. Thus, a way was found to analyse the internal, 
and not merely external connections between the economic and 
the political spheres - beyond such statements that 'the political 
sphere 'represses' the economy'.
3. What was intolerable in daily reality under communism?
If, one the one hand, there are serious problems about widely 
accepted explanations concerning the changes, there are, on the 
other hand, questions concerning the recent image of the past that 
come out of the discourse of the new elite. To talk about 40 years 
of 'communist dictatorship' in Hungary certainly does not help to 
illuminate the situation; it is clearly out of step at least with my 
experiences concerning the system. Not that it was not intolerable 
and suffocating. But, in my view, many of the most unbearable 
aspects of the former system were exactly related to the fact that 
it long ago ceased to be a simple dictatorship. The language of 
dictatorship is dangerous not only because it presents at most a 
partial truth, but also because of its strict division lines, it binary 
oppositions, its language that only knows good and evil helps to 
wash away the real questions concerning the impact and the 
legacy of the past.
It was exactly this ugly, grey, unshaky situation, this lack of clear 
values, dividing lines, stands, that was - among other things - so 
inacceptable in the Hungary of the last one or two decades. And 




























































































the past to talk clearly, to set up clear standards, even the famous 
call for official censorship were right to the point. But these 
dividing lines cannot be simply transposed today towards the 
past, when they did not exist in this form.
The discourse of the dictatorship is misleading, partial, incorrect; it 
is dangerous as it impedes and does not help clear sight and 
thinking. It is also a symptom. It points to the insufficiency of 
language. We do not possess a proper way to address power. We 
have no language to deal with it, except the language of the law. 
We have no tools to denounce situations that seem to be 
intolerable, except through looking for somebody to blame; 
somebody who is hiding behind the scenes, who is abusing his 
position, who is repressing and exploiting others. This failure of 
the language is not restricted to us in East Europe. It is this same 
language that comes to the fore whenever in any modern society a 
problem is observed, whenever certain individuals or groups raise 
a problem concerning the intolerability of the continuity of certain 
aspects of their existence, whether it is related to the situation 
between classes, races, sexes, adults and youngsters, husbands 
and wives, or even mental problems. It is this same language that 
is characteristic of Marxists, psychoanalysts, civil rights 
movements, feminists, new social movements, etc. The figures are 
the father or the judge, the tyrant or the liberator; the model is 
the tribunal, the uprising and the complete elimination of 
injustice.
There are many situations to which this language is adequate. But 
the problem is that, although we have many theories of power, we 
do not have an alternative language to use. This is the language 
used, irrespective of whether it is appropriate to the actual 
situation concerning the application of power and the feeling of 
intolerability. This is the problem that has been tackled by Michel 
Foucault, and that's why his work has such a relevance to so many 
questions in social and political thought today.
In my view, this approach is especially helpful for us today in East 



























































































not be subsumed under the categories of 'repression, exploitation, 
tyranny, and dictatorship', but that were felt to be intolerable. 
Moreover, I would risk the hypothesis the one of the reasons why 
today there seems to be such a large and widening gap between 
the new elite and the population at large is exactly due to the fact 
that the problems, the intolerability of the past systems were felt 
differently by the two groups. This point is often misconceived 
today, perhaps due to the perceived populist threat. It is often 
stated that assumed that the population 'at large' was in the past 
some sort of a beneficiary of the former system; a tacit, infantile 
ally of the paternalist system. This is a mistake - and it certainly 
would be unhelpful in explaining the definite rejection by the 
majority of the former system. The point is not that the 
population accepted the system, but that it was hurt in somewhat 
different ways. (5)
4, Foucault on power as government and on govemmentalitv
It is widely acknowledged by now that Foucault did some major 
works on the question of power. (6) However, there are some 
important points about his works that are much less known, but 
quite crucial for any use and interpretation. Let's review some of 
these.
1. Michel Foucault was not a social or political scientist. He 
was a philosopher. It does not mean that therefore his work is 
mere speculation, without any relevance to social or political 
analysis. Quite the contrary. But in order to perceive the 
difference he made, his status as a philosopher must be kept in 
mind, in order to avoid the mistake of misreading the difference 
of his work, by reducing him, for eg., to the status of another 
theorist of social control.
2. As a philosopher, Foucault had a particular problem - like 
Husserl or Heidegger. As he stated several time, his problem was 
not the question of power. It is more difficult to specify it in 
positive terms, even if in some of his late lectures, introductions, 
and interviews, he tried to specify it. His problem was the status 



























































































became objects of study in their very individuality, and were 
actively involved in this process of 'subjectivation': the 
construction of an identity on the basis of the discovery of the 
truth about themselves; and how all this was connected to the 
specific ways modem societies function. (7) Power only became 
important for him as if 'by default' - due to the fact that he found 
that there was a lack of tools for the analysis of power relations. 
(8) Which again does not disqualify a priori his excursions into 
the field of the problem of power. Quite the contrary, as the 
widespread references to his works make it obvious. Which, by 
the way, is an interesting methodological point on its own: it 
seems that sometimes we can tackle problems more successfully 
as a 'side dish'. When we want to confront them head on, with all 
our knowledge and might, and want to write 'the' theory of power 
or the state, one often finds the food to big too swallow.
3. On the basis of the volumes published - two books on the 
problem of power in 1975 and 1976; a long silence; finally the 
publication of two volumes on the history of sexuality different 
from the 1976 projections, and having nothing to do with the 
problems of power -, two interpretations suggest themselves 
concerning Foucault's works on power. First, that he thought the 
two volumes dealt with the problem comprehensively, and there 
was no need for further study. The second, opposite reading is 
that he found fault with these works, and dropped the whole 
topic. In fact, none of these interpretations stand up to inspection. 
For Foucault, the publication of a work did not mean a prelude to 
a long intellectual holiday, spent by becoming a living 
advertisement for the work; nor was it an occasion to close a 
finished chapter. On the contrary, it was an occasion to step back 
and reflect. And that's what he did in the late 70s and early 80s, 
giving lectures and publishing some articles and interviews that 
represent new directions in his conceptualisations of relations of 
power. (9)
At this place, only a few short comments can be made concerning 
these changes. First, in Discipline and Punish , Foucault proposed 
the concept of power as discipline, as opposed to the view of 



























































































later lectures and articles, he profoundly displaced his position. On 
the one hand, he gave a more general definition of power as 
government, of which discipline was only a possible aspect. He 
defined government as the 'conduct of conduct', or as 'action upon 
action', and no longer as direct action upon individuals, the 
production of certain types of individuality. (10) On the other, 
already in his 1976 lectures, he stepped outside the model of 
power as war, and gave a historical analysis of this view. (11)
Second, he shifted his emphasis from the micro-level to the 
question of the links between the micro and macro spheres, the 
techniques and rationalities of 'government'; the actual historical 
links made between the broad and narrow meanings of 
government: the government of the conduct of men, and the 
government of states. For these analyses, he developed the term 
'governmentality' or 'governmental rationality'. (12) This was, 
one the one hand, an analytical tool for the study of relations of 
power. In Foucault's words, the study of power should concern 
itself not with the problem of Law or the myth of Power, but 'with 
the complex and multiple practices of a "governmentality" which 
presupposes, on the one hand, rational forms, technical 
procedures, instrumentations through which to operate and, on 
the other hand, strategic games which subject the power relations 
they are supposed to guarantee to instability and reversal.' (13) 
On the other hand, the concept of 'governmentality' serves as a 
diagnosis for the specific Western 'mentality' concerning 
government, an urge to govern all sorts of behavior; an urge that 
is related but not restricted to the modern state. It is in this vein 
that he talked about govermentality as 'the manner in which the 
behavior of an ensemble of individuals became implicated, in an 
increasingly marked way, in the exercise of sovereign power'. (14) 
It is in this vein that he specified his views about the process of 
disciplining, stating that '[w]hat is to be understood by the 
disciplining of societies in Europe since the C18th is not, of course, 
that the individuals who are part of them become more and more 
obedient, not that they set about assembling in barracks, schools, 
or prisons: rather that an increasingly better invigilated process of 



























































































more rational and economic - between productive activities, 
resources of communication, and the play of power relations.’ (IS) 
And it is also in this vein that he altered his diagnosis concerning 
both the key characteristics and the major dangers of the exercise 
of power and power relations in modern societies.
Foucault's concern in all his works was that he found the standard 
interpretation concerning the relations between truth, freedom, 
and individuality, on the one hand, and power on the other 
insufficient. Power, especially the type of power prevalent in 
modern sexieties, is not simply outside truth, freedom, and the 
individual, though is obviously neither identical with them. His 
aim was to think their relationships in ever novel ways, in order 
to effectuate a real change in our freedom and individuality. His 
major point was not to take up an untenable v iew that modern 
societies are thoroughly penetrated with 'Power', but that the 
danger is that they became quite involved with government, 
interpreted in the broad sense, in ways that our traditional 
discourse centering on repression and the law is not able even to 
conceptualise. Instead of adhering to indiv iduality and its deep 
truth as a source of resistance to power, one should study the 
ways in which individuals in modern societies are urged to 
discover their own truth, and are supposed to behave according to 
the 'prison' of an identity they fabricate for themselves, by the 
full exercise of their freedom. Instead of opposing 'freedom' to 
'power', one must think 'modernity' as a system in which the very 
freedom of individuals became incorporated into complex 
strategical games - in the words of Foucault, liberty now has 
become an indispensable element of governmentaliiy itself. (10) 
This opens up novel possibilities, but also involves the trap that it 
is all too easy to reduce one's freedom to the choice between pre­
fabricated models of individualities, with the techniques gaining 
access to the 'deep self doing the job of actively involving the 
individual in this fabrication. Perhaps one may say that Foucault 
agrees that there are much more openings and free games in 
modern societies to work one's way toward true individuality, but 




























































































these games; lose the distance from one's own actions, and thus 
the ability to change.
All these considerations seem to lie far apart from the reality of 
East Europe. But is it really so? Is not the questions of truth and 
lie, rationality and irrationality, the status of modernity and 
modernisation, the question of freedom and the power exercised 
in daily life, in a regular, continuous manner, over individuals, a 
central problem of East Europe?
5. Raison d'état and 'police'
The aim of the research on which this paper is based was to apply 
the tools developed by Foucault for the study of East Europe. 
However, it turned out that some of the very results of Foucault's 
analyses also were particularly relevant. Foucault attempted to 
conceptualise the transition from 'absolutist' to 'liberal' 
governmental rationality in a novel way, without having recourse 
to a theory' of the state, or a given conceptual schema like the 
growth of bureaucracy or rationality, the struggle between state 
and civil society, the colonisation of the life-world, the logic of 
capitalism, the struggle of classes, or the dialectic of the base and 
infrastructure. In order to explain the crisis of a ’socialist’ 
governmental rationality, we first have to specify what it was; 
whether there was such a thing?
It is well-known that as soon as socialists acquire political power 
under any circumstances, they immediately run into difficulties 
concerning the practical tasks of government. It is particularly 
well-known and documented in the case of bolsheviks. I only 
want to make two points here. First, any state in the 20th century 
needs some art of government. If one refused the liberal method 
and had not even a hint of the need of an alternative, one may 
well have had to accept the only available alternative possibility: 
the theory of raison d 'état. (17) All talk about the accidentally 
of war communism or the claim that the socialist economy was a 




























































































not simply as 'war economy', only in the sense in which the very 
theory of raison d'état as a governmental rationality implies a 
quasi-military model for the organisation of the economy and the 
society in times of peace. Second, any government that tries to 
base itself on the willing and ready participation of individuals, 
needs to ascertain the compliance of the actual behaviour to the 
ideal of self-government and self-discipline. Now, due to a 
number of different factors, the method chosen for this 
individual-oriented disciplining, the deployment of the party 
apparatus, was an almost perfect copy of the governmental 
apparatus and technology that accompanied the raison d'état in 
the so-called 'absolutist' states: the 'police'. (18)
This is not the place to discuss the problem of 'absolutist' 
government. Still, a few points must be made for our exposition. 
Raison d'état was a specific governmental rationality with its goal 
given as the growth of the forces of the state. It found in the 
'police' a proper governmental technology to fulfil its goal.
In the 16-18th centuries, the 'police' was not just an apparatus of 
the state, a force existing outside of society and threatening its 
very fabric. Quite the opposite: in the early 16th century, 
following the Greek usage, especially in France 'police' meant the 
constution. At that period, it had nothing to do with the legal 
concept of the constitution; it rather referred to the veiy material 
constitution of society, what we would call the social structure. 
(19) Later, from the beginning of the 17th century, this was 
increasingly given as a task, and not as a statement of fact: the 
good 'police', the ordered structure of the state had to be 
maintained and created; the social ties that were threated by 
religious and civil wars, increased mobility and vagabonds, had to 
be reinforced. This was not a completely new phenomenon. Since 
the waning of the middle ages, there was a constant concern with 
the maintenance of social hierarchy throughout Europe - one only 
has to refer here to the sumptuary laws. (20) What was new was 
the scale of the problem, and the eventual solution found to this 




























































































In time, the aim of the police concerning the reinforcement of the 
social structure became somewhat shifted towards the 
reinforcement of the middle classes. The police was something of a 
tool for em bourgeoisem ent . This, by the way, shows some 
interesting light on the special case of Britain, both in the past and 
the present. The absence of the 'police' in Britain not only meant 
the lack of hindrance to freedom, but also the maintained polarity 
of the social structure. Though in one particular period, it may 
have served as an 'advantage', but today, it probably contributes 
to England's contemporary problems, and its steady slide towards 
an occasionally almost third-world-like status.
The result of the combination and co-adjustment of raison d'état 
and 'police' was an increased pressure on individuals. It was the 
joining of the forces of the state to the traditional, authoritarian 
types of social controls that made the daily life under 'absolutist' 
regimes ever more insupportable, and that contributed so much to 
the. revolutions and the victory of liberalism. The reason why 
liberalism gave a solution was exactly that it based order on 
individuals; on disciplined individuals, following their own self- 
interest. (21)
This solution, however, almost immediately presented a dual 
problem concerning social structure. For conservatives, 
individualism threatened the very fabric of society. Though often 
mistrustful of the monster of the 'state', they mourned the loss of 
a good 'police'. Socialists, on the other hand, attacked the actual 
joining of the forces of the new, individualistic order and the old 
social structure: the inequality of access to the benefits of new 
system, the threat of new police, whose main target was to 
preserve new economic and not old social relations, although the 
two were often related: the history of social and civil rights 
movements is the history of the successive separation of these 
ties.
The transposition of these models into 20th century East Europe, 



























































































the doctrine of raison d'état was invented at a period when 'the 
economy' did not yet exist. The 'economy', therefore, was not a 
sphere which towards which this doctrine had a proper, rational 
attitude. Moreover, it was instrumental in bringing about the 
creation of the economy. (22) However, in the bolshevik version, 
this development, due to ideological reasons, was precluded from 
the start. Any such orientations were repressed in their 
rudimentary stage. One could say that in a way, the bolsheviks 
'learned' from the history of absolutism: they made it sure that 
the possibility of the future solution was eliminated in advance. 
(23) Thus, in the Soviet case, the crisis of this governmental 
rationality had to be different from the case of the Western crisis 
around the turn of the 19th century, when the new solution could 
have been based on the real impact and partial attainments of 
'reason of states'; and also, this 'rationality' had something of the 
absurd in it from the start.
The second problem, closely related to the first is the 'rediscovery' 
of the 'police' and its links with the social structure. Although 
originally the 'police' was a technology for the reinforcement of 
community, (24) it became effective only because it successfully 
'produced' certain forms of individuality. The 'police' was a 
technology for isolating individuals, making them conscious of the 
own activity and seif, trying to increase their own forces when left 
aione, to target one's energies into abstract goals, unrelated to 
given, contextual, mundane concerns. Its aim was the 
capitalisation of efforts; the shaping of an individual into a 'human 
capital'. Now', the goals towards w'hich this disciplining, this 
specific orientation of the 'conduct of life' - to use a Weberian 
term - can be different: salvation; profit; the common good; the 
building of socialism. One thing is certain: this is by definition 
against the view's and attitudes of the popular and working 
classes. This is a method to shape a middle class.
That's w'hy bolshevism was never a movement or an ideology of 
the w'orking classes. But that is not the only point here. It is 
related to the absurdity, the inherent irrationality' of the whole 




























































































the purposes, the ideology which these techniques were allegedly 
serving. The absurdity can be traced in both main aspect of the 
'police': the goal of maintaining the social structure, and of shaping 
individual behavior.
The problem of the 'police' was to defend the social structure, to 
increase its cohesion. It had to Fight the very forces that were 
disrupting it, thus it had to posit himself outside the law. The 
bolshevik 'police', the party apparatus, on the other hand, first 
disrupted the very social structure the 'police' was attempting to 
promote, its main targets being exactly those aspects of society 
the 'police' was trying to promote: the middle classes. After that, it 
tried to build a social structure. But technique used - the 'police' - 
was incompatible with the ideology - working classes, solidarity, 
collectivity. Moreover, due to the destruction of existing social 
structures and ties, this strive for a 'community' had no basis in 
real life whatsoever. On the contrary, it led to an enormous 
disorientation for individuals. What gave life stability in the past 
suddenly disappeared or was questioned.
Second, the 'police' could only accomplish its tasks by focusing on 
the individual - disciplining, shaping, forming, moulding 
individual behavior. Starting as a tool to restore the community, it 
ended up being a technique for the shaping of individuals. At the 
end, this turned against itself in a certain way - the aim to shape 
individuals who follow their interests and not their passions may 
well have succeeded, but this meant the demise of the very social 
and political order the 'police' tried to create. Still, in this case, 
there was a certain coherence between the strategies deployed to 
promote order, and the type of individuality that emerged as a 
response to these questions.
The bolshevik-type state-parties ended up using the same 
mechanisms in order to promote community and to shape and 
control individual behavior, but in a manner that worked against 
the very mechanisms deployed. They promoted calculable, 
conscious, interest-oriented behavior, but denied its satisfaction, 



























































































incompatibility was not so much 'atomisation', as the promotion of 
a new form of subjectivity: frustrated individualisation. All the 
efforts of the official sphere went towards the creation of a certain 
type of self-governing, self-controlled, self-disciplined individual, 
but the system was unable to base itself on this type of 
individuality due to a fear of 'capitalism', etc. It promoted and 
then refused the perhaps only possible way that could have been 
used to coordinate individuals who were shaped in this manner: 
self-interest. (25)
Individuals who are first disoriented and then frustrated 
desperately need some sort of basic stability. This explains the 
second, also unexpected and perhaps surprising effect of life 
under communism in Hungary: the exclusive importance of 
personal relationships and connections. There were two images of 
the world, of the way things were going, matters could be 
arranged under communism. The official one: strict discipline, 
bureaucracy, and hierarchy. And the real one: the backdoor and 
the direct telephone line. All this is well-known by now from the 
literature. (26) But less attention is paid for interconnections and 
perhaps inherently functional impacts. For individuals living 
under the system, the two strategies were opposite. The formal 
system did not exist in its strict form since a long time in Hungary; 
perhaps never did. But it existed as a threat, as a potentiality. It 
justified the second; made it not only acceptable, but even 
rightful, a proper strategy of survival and resistance. And, 
moreover, the link also worked the other way around. The 
systems of personal links that consisted in the real 'undercurrent' 
of the formal official system helped to reinforce the official 
system. And here we return to an important difference between 
popular and elite perceptions of the reality of communism.
For the elite, the key dividing line existed between the networks 
of official system - the state and party apparatus and the 
nomenclatura - and its own circles, itself divided among populists 
and urbanists, former communists and former participants of the 
1956 revolution. For the large part of the population, however, the 



























































































clearly visible. They were all too aware that firstly, there were 
manifold connections between the two sides; secondly, that all 
segments of the elite did have access to the better, decent jobs, 
while hardly anyone outside these circles stood a chance; and 
finally, that these elites were fairly closed upon themselves - the 
nomenclatura still being the most open of them. In this situation, 
the acceptance of the pursuit of a career along the official lines did 
no longer involve a major ethical wager, a 'selling' of one's soul, 
but the only possible solution for a way upwards, at the price of 
the minor inconvenience of putting up with some degree of party 
ideology and participation in meetings - in a situation where for 
decades, there was little visible signs of repression, and where the 
memories of the last popular upsurge and the consequent 
repressions were quite efficiently swept under the carpet for a 
long time.
6. Conclusion
These points raise two problems that cannot be handled by the 
important legal changes of the political system. First, how would it 
be possible to get rid of the legacy of frustrated individualisation, 
without claiming that it is necessary to push the whole population 
again through a now 'proper' 'policing' - that is at any rate an 
impossibility - ,  or without promoting some sort of shock-therapy 
of 'possessive individualisation' through the the disciplinary 
effects of private property - another strategy that is doomed to 
failure from the start? Second, how to break up the pervasive 
presence of reliance upon direct, personal connections and 
networks in all aspects of social, cultural, economic, political, 
academic, etc. life, where the system of such connections presents 
at least three problems: the reliance on these relations is almost 
exlusive; it is hardly at all connected to performance and ability; 
and in it, there are not more than traces of a Weberian ethos of 
impaotiality, neutrality, judgment, without which a modern 
society simply cannot function. There is too much talk about the 
extensive bureaucratisation today, on the basis of the mistaken 



























































































little attention being paid on the perhaps more serious problem of 
the lack of a proper bureaucracy and bureaucratic ethos.
Volumes of articles may be written on the legacy of communism 
in terms of the current influence of former party members, the 
guilt of secret police agents, the salvaging of the nomenclatura, the 
ties between fathers and sons, etc. etc. Without denying the 
importance and partial truth of most of these points, 'frustrated 
individualisation' and the all-pervasive network of personal 
connections may have a much larger and more penetrating impact 
on the future.
Finally, the application language of power that is outside the 
model of the law is also crucial for the current situation in Eastern 
Europe, where there is an all-too great emphasis exactly on this 
language. (27) The point is not to deny the importance of 
rechtstaat or the problem of human rights - that would be absurd 
anyway. But to point out that an exaggerated importance 
attributed to questions of - or the power of - the law reinforces a 
gap between the elite and the population, and neglects the 
problems of power exercised in daily reality that was as 
important and as intolerable an aspect of daily reality as the 
macro-level considerations of legitimacy, and that may have a 
much more prolonged legacy.
A central aspect of the changes is that the exercise of political 
power today is legitimate now in these countries, according to the 
criteria of the 20th century. This is a very important point. But 
once this is settled, another question have to come to the fore: 
what is the substance of this now legitimate power? How is it 
exercised? What happens when it is exercised? How is it related to 
our daily reality? To these, and related questions, the legal model 
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